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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK ALDON HEWITT, 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
-vs.-
THE GENERAL TIRE AND RUB-
BER COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8038 
Appellant's Brief 
in Ansvver to Respondent's 
Petition for Rehearing 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE 
JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
For convenience, the Appellant answers the first 
two points of Respondent's brief under this one heading. 
Although the Petition for Rehearing and brief in sup-
port thereof, if confined to the record, do not raise any 
new matters which were not covered by the briefs pre-
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viou~ly submitted in this matter, we nevertheless feel 
t·oustrained to submit this answer brief. 
The first point raised by the brief in support of the 
p(•tition for rehearing is that the inference that the 
<lefl'ndant was negligent was not warranted by the evi-
d('lH'('. ~rhe evidence under this point was quite fully 
~un1marized in appellant's brief on appeal to which we 
re~pectfully refer the court. The defendant urges that 
the jury could reasonably find from the evidence in 
this case that the plaintiff was negligent and the evidence 
upon "·hich defendant's rely in this connection is the 
experiment which it performed on a similar tire, which 
established that it required 155 pounds of air pressure 
to break the wires in the bead and explode the tire. In 
a second experiment on the same tire after the bead 
wires had been broken the tire did not explode until 53 
pounds of air had been introduced into it. The defendant 
infers . from this experiment that plaintiff must have 
been negligent in that he must have put 155 pounds of 
air into the tire (notwithstanding his positive evidence 
that he did not), because otherwise the tire would not 
have exploded. Defendant points to the further evidence 
that the air tank at plaintiff's service station was main-
tained at a pressure of 175 pounds, and, therefore, 
defendant infers, plaintiff must have used at least 155 
pounds of the available air. It would be much more 
reasonable to infer from the experiment, in light of all 
the evidence in the case, that the experimental tire was 
without defect as it had the specified strength to with-
stand 155 pounds of air before the bead wires broke, 
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\Yherens the tire \Yhirh injnrPd the plaintiff \Yas grPatly 
defertiYe bern use it \Yas capable of \Yithstanding a pres-
sure of h\ss than 40 pounds. Another reasonable infer-
ence to be dra\vn from the l"\xperiment is that the tire 
\vhich injured the plaintiff must have been more defec-
tive in respects other than the broken bead wires than 
the experimental tire because it exploded when inflated 
with less than 40 pounds of a.ir; whereas, the experi-
mental tire after the wires had been broken did not 
explode until it had received 53 pounds of air. 
Again counsel complains that the court completely 
overlooked all the testimony relative to the explosion 
being caused by the used tube being placed in the tire 
and becoming wedged between the bead of the tire and 
the rim. In this respect, counsel shows an abject devo-
tion to improper inference. He states the proposition 
that the plaintiff placed a. used tube in the tire, which 
is true. From this solitary fact, he infers, against the 
direct evidence, that the plaintiff improperly mounted 
the tire; and he further infers that part of the tube, 
because it was used, became wedged between the bead 
and the rim. From this, counsel further assumes that 
all the 20 bead wires were broken by less than 40 pounds 
of air pressure ; and he blames a.ll this on a used tube, 
from which we conclude that the only safe thing to do 
to a used tube is to burn it. In arriving at its verdict, 
the jury was not required to follow defendant's devious 
course of reasoning with respect to the used tube. On 
the contrary it found the plaintiff's testimony to be true 
and it believed Dr. Linford when he stated that the 
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ex plo~iou was caused because the bead wires were 
dLlfPet iv(•, allowing the tube to extrude, and under his 
ntathemati<·al c·alculations, the tire exploded under a 
strPsH of 1,000 pounds rather than 5,600 pounds. Under 
the l'\·idt·tH'P the tire was properly mounted by the plain-
tiil', aud lte PXamined the tire in the mounting process to 
Inake t·t~rtain thu t no portion of the tube was wedged 
hllt \\'t~en the easing and the rim. There was testimony 
by l~~spoudent 's expert ~lr. Taylor that the explosion 
might have Lt·t·n caused by the wedging of the tube 
ht·tween the bead and the rim, assuming that the tube 
\Vas '\\'L~dged bet"Teen the bead and the rim. But even 
on this hypothetical situation, the jury was entitled to 
belieYe Dr. Linford when he stated that, assuming such 
fact to be true, it would not be a significant factor in 
the explosion. 
There was no evidence from which it could reason-
ably be inferred that the plaintiff was negligent. Under 
the particular evidence in this case there was no evi-
dence from which it could be reasonably inferred that 
a third party caused the explosion. From the particular 
evidence in this case, the inference is compelling that 
the explosion was not caused by a third party because 
of the extraordinary force that would be required to 
break the bead. 
The defendant would induce the court to infer that 
the insulated bead wires may have lost their strength 
to resist less than 40 pounds of air pressure simply 
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b~~a.use the tire had been stored for a period. of time. 
The manufaeturer of a tirt'' could not take much pride 
in its product if it 'vould become worthless through 
being exposed to the 'Yeather conditions that existed in 
the storeroom of the Granite Furniture Company during 
the period of time involved. There was no evidence that 
the room in 'Yhich the tire 'vas stored "'"as either cold, 
damp, "~et or otherwise rlimatized in any manner that 
could have adversely affected the tire; and tires in their 
normal and expected use are subjected to all types of 
cold, damp, muddy weather conditions. 
It thus appears, although the defendant is allergic 
to the use of reasonable, if not compelling, inferences by 
the court, defendant does not hesitate to urge upon the 
court many inferences that are neither reasonable nor 
compelling, from which the writer concludes that the 
defendant's aversion to inferences is limited strictly to 
those which are reasonable and compelling and his devo-
tion to inferences is limited strictly to those which are 
remote and unlikely, but which benefit his theory. 
Among other things, the jury in arriving at its ver-
dict, and this court in reinstating it were entitled to find 
that the tire was new and had never been mounted 
before; that in the absence of defect the strength of the 
bead wires was such that the tire would not explode 
until 155 pounds of air pressure had been inserted into 
it or 5,600 pounds of force had been applied to pull the 
bead; that the wire used in the bead was delivered to 
the plaintiff on large reels about three feet in diameter 
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autl \\'t: ig-lHld between 600 and 700 pounds; that the wire 
\\'tlt; fin.;t delivered to the defendant's Akron, Ohio, plant 
and frou1 tht~re removed to defendant's Wako, Texas, 
plant (ne<"essarily requiring the use of machinery in 
baudliug-) ; that the tire exploded after being properly 
u1ouuted wl1tln less than 40 pounds of air had been intro-
dta·t>d iuto it; that x-rays taken of the tire after the 
t>Xplol"ion indieated that all of the 20 wires were broken; 
the bead was so defective that it could not withstand a 
pull of 1,000 pounds rather than 5,600 pounds,. which 
represented the specification for a non-defective bead; 
that in the manufacture of tires the defendant makes 
the following inspections (each one of which could have 
been negligently made, and at least one of which-the 
last one-must have been negligently made}: 
(a) The bead wires are inspected as they leave the 
reels. ( R. 346) 
(b) The beads are inspected in the beginning of 
the tire making process after the wires are wound. (R. 
324) 
(c) After the bead wrap has been applied, they are 
inspected again to see that the wrap completely covers 
the wire. ( R. 328) 
(d) After the tire has been completely examined 
on a drum, it is inspected before traveling on a conveyor 
to the case room. (R. 345) 
(e) There is an inspection at the baggage extractor 
mechanism after the tire is cured where beads have been 
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kinked and a. lot of defective tires are dra,vn out. (R. 
355) 
(f) When tires leaYe thl) curing room .they are 
hung on a conYeyor which passes through the Inspec-
tion department for final inspection. (R. 343) 
(g) The inspector takes the tire with each hand 
and puts force on both beads of the tire. If he rejects 
the tire, he puts it into a pile which passes to another 
department for further investigation. (R. 344) If the 
majority of the wires in the bead are broken, or if the 
bead is kinked, the final inspector will detect it if he 
does his job properly. (R. 356) 
It is unconceivable that a tire so defective as the 
tire involved in this lawsuit could have left the defend-
ant's factory without negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The manufacturer knew that the tire was a 
highly dangerous instrumentality which could cause 
serious bodily injury or death if it were put to the use 
for which it was designed. Certainly they would have 
the duty to carefully inspect and to test, if necessary, 
the tire before placing it upon the market. The evidence 
is clear in this case that the defect in this tire could 
have been easily detected by mere manual flexion of the 
tire, and that such procedure is supposed to be followed 
when the tire passes through its final inspection. 
Throughout its brief the defendant has overlooked 
the esta~lished principle recognized in the opinion of 
the court, that on an appeal from a directed verdict the 
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evidc·nce ntust be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to thL~ losing party. 
POINT II. 
rl'HIH CASJ~~ D()J~~S NOT EXTEND THE DOC-
rl'Hll\~~ ()F, ItEH IPSA LOQUITUR TO CASES 
\rHJ~~RE rriii•~ J)()(~TJ{IN~ HAS NO APPLICATION. 
In its brief defendant arrays against the unbiased 
decision of this court, the biased opinion of a contributor 
to the ''Insurance Counsel Journal'' which criticizes the 
very recent Wisconsin case of Ryan vs. Philco, 1954, 266 
Wis. 630, 64 N.E. 2d 226. Mr. Gibbs (the contributor) 
is not only opposed to the Wisconsin decision, but he is 
also opposed to Prosser on Torts and to the majority 
view in the bursting bottle cases, and we assume that 
Mr. Gibbs would also be opposed to the decision rendered 
by this court in this case. We desire to take the fol-
lowing quotation from the Wisconsin case, appearing 
at page 233 of the N. E. Reports: 
''In the instant case we are of the opinion that 
the plaintiff would establish that there was no 
intervening negligence on the part of other per-
sons which could have caused the short circuit in 
the sealed unit of the refrigerator after it left 
Philco 's possession. Philco is charged with knowl-
edge that such refrigerators are transported by 
common carrier from its factory to points of dis-
tribution and sale, and that purchasers of the 
~arne do on occasion have to remove them the 
same as other household furniture and appliances 
when they move from one place of residence to 
another. Therefore, it is also the duty of the 
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defendant to so make such sealed unit that the 
ordinary jars and jolts received in transportation 
by common carrier, or in moving the refrigerator 
by motor truck from one location to another would 
not dislodge its parts so as to cause a short cir-
cuit. The eYidence disclosed the position and 
handling of the refrigerator from the time it was 
uncrated at the shop of the dealer to the time of 
the accident. It 'vas transported by the dealer in 
the normal course of business and installed in 
the Zick home at Fox Lake by merely plugging 
the refrigerator cord into an electric outlet. When 
the Zicks moved from Fox Lake to Beaver Dam 
they employed a professional mover to move the 
furniture and the refrigerator. That such moving 
had no effect on the mechanism of the refrigerator 
is attested by the fact that Mrs. Zick noticed the 
same tingling sensation when mopping the floor 
in the home at Fox Lake before such moving that 
was observed after. It was definitely established 
that no one attempted to adjust or tinker with 
the sealed unit mechanism. In other words, Phil-
co's original exclusive control of the sealed unit 
carried up to the time of the accident, even though 
its physical possession thereof had ended at 
the time of shipment. We, therefore, on the 
basis of analogy to the bursting bottle cases, think 
that it was entirely proper to invoke the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, and permit the jury to draw 
the inference that it did from the short circuit 
causing plaintiff's injury. Refrigerators do not 
ordinarily transmit electric current through the 
handle so as to severely shock and injure persons 
who may grasp such handle in the customary use 
thereof. 
"The duty to exercise· reasonable care on the 
part of the manufacturer of an article, which if 
defective, may be imminently dangerous, includes 
the proper inspection and testing of the article. ' ' 
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The ease cites with approval a Minnesota case of 
J>etersou rs. M·i,unesota Power a;n.d Light Company, 207 
l\1 inu. :~87; 2!)1 N. W. 705, 707, and Bosch vs. Damm, 296 
l\1 h·l1. 52~; 206 N. W. 669. 
\V P ~ulnnit that the Wisconsin decision, deplored by 
1\tr. <lihh~ in the "lusurance Counsel Journal," is a well 
reasoned decision ; and we respectfully commend it to 
this l'ourt 's attention. 
The ease of Jlatievitch vs. Hercules Powder Com-
pany, (lTtah), 282 P. 2d 1044, is clearly distinguishable 
from the case at bar. In that case there was no evidence 
explaining the explosion of the dynamite and cap, and 
there was no evidence as to how and why the dynamite 
exploded. In the case now before the court, there was 
evidence of a defective bead and evidence that a defec-
tive bead caused the explosion. We see no inconsistency 
between the court's decision in this case and its decision 
in the Hercules Powder Company case. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON 
THE VERDICT AND THE JUDGMENT FROM 
APRIL 23, 1953. 
Counsel for the defendant have stated that in the 
event the petition for rehearing is denied they will not 
pay interest on the judgment from the time the verdict 
and judgment on the verdict were entered. There is ap-
proximately $2,500.00 interest involved in this case. The 
verdict was rendered April 23, 1953, (R. 63-A) and the 
10 
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judgment on the Yerdirt \Yas entered April ~:~rd, 1953. 
(R. 63). 
Section 15-1-4, [Tfah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
that the judgment obtained in this case shall bear 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Rule 54 (e) pro-
vides as follows : 
" (e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the 
Judgment. The clerk must include in any judg-
ment signed by him any interest on the verdict 
or decision from the time it was rendered, and 
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascer-
tained. The clerk must, within two days after 
the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any 
case where not included in the judgment, insert 
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judg-
ment for that purpose, and make a similar nota-
tion thereof in the Register of Actions and in the 
Judgment Docket.'' 
This court in its decision ordered that the judgment 
upon the jury verdict be reinstated. We respectfully 
contend that the judgment should bear interest from 
April 23, 1953, as the clerk is required by statute to 
allow interest from the date of the verdict, and plaintiff 
would not receive full justice under the law upon rein-
statement of the verdict unless such interest is allowed. 
In view of the expressed attitude of counsel for the 
defendant in this matter, we respectfully move this court 
to include in its order denying the petition for rehear-
ing a further order allowing plaintiff interest on the 
judgment on the verdict from April 23, 1953, in order 
to obviate the necessity of this matter being brought 
11 
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again before this court in a later proceeding. In the 
('ase of Keller vs. Ohournos, 95 Utah 31, 70 P. 2d 86, the 
court revised its judgment to include interest at the 
statutory rate, which had inadvertently been omitted 
from its opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully conclude that the decision rendered 
in this matter is in all respects fair, just and right and 
properly applies the law to the evidence in this case, and 
that the defendant's Petition for Rehearing should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
0/IU], Appelloot. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
